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In the wake of the U.S. housing bubble and collapse and the consequent financial 
collapse of 2007-2009 and its severe consequences for the U.S. economy, it is unsurprising that 
there have been calls for policy makers to prevent future asset price bubbles – through the better 
exercise of monetary policy and/or financial regulatory policy.  This essay focuses on financial 
regulation and argues that such efforts would, at best, be ineffective and, at worst, could squelch 
productive and efficient asset pricing.  Instead, policy makers should focus on better regulatory 
efforts – better prudential regulation – to ameliorate the consequences of asset bubble deflations 
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Preventing Bubbles: What Role for Financial Regulation? 
 
 
“The shapers of the American mortgage finance system hoped to achieve the security of 
government ownership, the integrity of local banking and the ingenuity of Wall Street. 
Instead they got the ingenuity of government, the security of local banking and the 
integrity of Wall Street.” 
 
-  David Frum (columnist, and former speechwriter for  
President George W. Bush), National Post, July 11, 2008 
 
I. Introduction 
  It is now quite clear that the U.S. economy went through a massive housing bubble, 
starting in the late 1990s and lasting through mid 2006.  The inflating of that bubble was 
encouraged, to a considerable extent, by the expansion and especially the securitization of 
residential mortgage finance.  The housing bubble, in turn, reinforced that mortgage expansion 
and securitization. 
The deflating of the housing bubble has had severe negative consequences: first, for the 
U.S. financial sector (which had both created and invested in the mortgage securitization 
instruments) and, subsequently, for the overall U.S. economy.  Given these severe consequences, 
it is surely no surprise that there have been calls for policy makers to prevent future asset price 
bubbles – through the better exercise of monetary policy and/or financial regulatory policy. 
  This essay will focus on financial regulation.  We will argue that the use of financial 
regulation to try to prevent bubbles is a mistake – a fool’s errand.  Bubbles are easy to identify 
after the fact but much harder (or impossible) to identify beforehand.  In the absence of (the near 
impossible) success in correctly identifying bubbles beforehand, efforts to address bubbles 
beforehand run the severe risk of squelching efficient and productive price changes – the “false 
positives” – as well as squelching the speculative and ultimately wasteful price changes of a 
bubble.   3
However, what financial regulation – specifically, prudential regulation – can do is to 
ameliorate the consequences of a bursting bubble for the financial sector.
1 
  This essay will expand on these ideas:  Section II discusses bubbles and why efforts to try 
to address them directly through financial regulation – or, indeed, through any public policy – 
are unwise.  Section III offers a brief contrast of the consequences of the bursting of two recent 
bubbles: the U.S. “tech” stock market bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the 
2000s, and draws the conclusion that the latter’s bursting was far more devastating because too 
much of the consequences fell directly on the thinly capitalized/highly leveraged financial sector 
that could ill afford the losses that the bursting created.  Section IV then focuses on prudential 
regulation of financial institutions and its important features.  Section V offers a brief conclusion. 
 
                                                 
1 In this respect, the general argument parallels that found in Mishkin (2008); see also Malkiel (2010).   4
II. Bubbles 
  After the fact, bubbles are always easy to identify:  For a specific asset class, asset prices 
went up; subsequently they went back down.  Therefore, this asset class experienced a bubble. 
  The U.S. housing bubble of the 2000s is only the most recent asset bubble.
2  Earlier 
bubbles of the past few decades include: 
  -- The U.S. “tech” stock market bubble of the late 1990s; 
  -- The Japanese real estate bubble of the 1980s; 
  -- The Japanese stock market of the 1980s; and 
  -- The gold market bubble of the 1970s. 
  Of course, the history of asset bubbles’ expanding and collapsing stretches far longer; 
that history encompasses the U.S. stock market expansion of the 1920s and subsequent collapse 
in the early 1930s; Florida land speculation of the 1920s; periodic U.S. railroad speculative 
bubbles of the late nineteenth century; the French (John Law) Mississippi land and British South 
Sea bubbles of the early eighteenth century; and the Dutch tulip mania bubble of the early 
seventeenth century.  Economic and financial historians could surely expand considerably upon 
this list.
3 
  However, the definitive identification of a bubble is always an after-the-fact event.   
During the period of the asset price increase, there will always be a diversity of opinion, 
including skeptics as well as enthusiasts – after all, someone must be selling at the time that the 
enthusiasts are buying – but during the period of the price increase the sentiment of the 
enthusiasts outweighs that of the skeptics.  But this is no different from a period of an asset price 
increase that is based on what afterward turns out to be a solid foundation: e.g., the rise in 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that the U.S. was not alone in experiencing a housing bubble.  The U.K., Ireland, and Spain 
experienced housing bubbles of roughly similar magnitudes to that of the U.S. 
3 Indeed, Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) provide evidence on “eight centuries of financial folly”.   5
importance of the telegraph in the middle of the nineteenth century, the rise of the importance of 
the telephone in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the rise of the automobile in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the rise of radio broadcasting in the early twentieth century 
and then the rise of television broadcasting in the middle of the twentieth century, etc.   
Enthusiasts promoted these trends; skeptics expressed doubt.
4 
  In each of these instances there will be asset price rises that are associated with these 
trends – whether it is the share prices of the companies that are at the center of these trends or 
land prices of geographic areas that are proximate to these trends (e.g., Detroit for automobiles).  
Any beforehand attention to these “bubbles” by public policy – in essence, paying greater 
attention to the skeptics -- would risk squelching efficient allocations of resources.  Further, in 
some instances there may be a longer-run expansion and then deflation of the asset prices (e.g., 
General Motors’ stock or Detroit land prices).  Should these types of longer-run asset price 
inflations and subsequent deflations also be included as “bubbles” that warrant public policy 
attention? 
  As this brief review highlights, any discussion about “bubbles” is really a discussion 
about the efficiency of financial markets.  Again, after the fact, it is easy to identify bubbles and 
thereby to conclude that the financial markets had been mistaken during the period of the asset 
price run up.  However, it is a large leap from this after-the-fact conclusion to a real-time 
determination that the financial markets are currently mistaken in the valuation of a specific 
category of asset.  The proper action for anyone who has this belief is to find an opportunity to 
sell the asset short – not to try to convince policy makers that intervention is warranted. 
                                                 
4 Of course, there have also been instances – e.g., personal jet-packs, picture telephones, helicopters’ replacing 
automobiles, etc. – where the skeptics of new technologies have been correct.   6
Further, it is an equally large leap from the after-the-fact conclusions that there have been 
asset bubbles to the public policy determination that financial markets are generally inefficient 
and therefore warrant widespread intervention to ward off asset bubbles (as well as other ills of 
inefficient markets).  To make this leap would mean that policy makers should be giving 
excessive weight – more than the financial markets give – to the skeptics (bears); and it is far 
from clear why policy makers should have superior knowledge as compared to the collective 
sentiment of the financial markets at such times.  Instead, the proper action for policy makers is 
to focus on areas where market failures are large and pervasive (and are not likely to be 
swamped by the problems of government failures) rather than heeding the skeptics and/or those 
who believe that the financial markets are pervasively inefficient.
5 
  As of early 2011, gold as an asset class has experienced a ten-year run up in prices.  Is 
this a bubble? 
 
                                                 
5 On issues of market failure versus government failure, see White (1997) and, more generally, Wolf (1989).   7
III. Different Consequences from Different Asset Bubble Deflations 
  To express skepticism about public policy’s ability accurately to spot asset bubbles in 
advance, as was done in the previous section, is not to deny that there can be serious 
consequences from the eventual deflation of an asset bubble.  The severity of those consequences 
can be related to the extent of the involvement of crucial parts of the financial sector.  A 
comparison of the consequences of the deflating of the “tech” bubble of the late 1990s and the 
deflating of the housing bubble of the 2000s illustrates this differential severity. 
A. The bursting of the “tech” bubble. 
  Between year-end 1999 and year-end 2002, the bursting of the “tech” bubble of the late 
1990s led to approximately $7 trillion in aggregate U.S. stock market losses.
6  This massive loss 
of wealth had serious consequences for the U.S. economy:  The economy slowed and entered a 
recession in March 2001, hitting a trough in November 2001.  The unemployment rate rose from 
3.9% in October 2000 and peaked at 6.3% in June 2003. 
However, the recession was considered to be relatively shallow by recent standards.  In 
essence, the loss of wealth was absorbed, the economy slowed and dipped, and then the economy 
moved on. 
B. The bursting of the housing bubble. 
  According to the Case-Shiller index of residential housing prices, U.S. housing prices hit 
a peak in June 2006.  At the time, U.S. single-family housing in aggregate was valued at 
approximately $19.4 trillion.
7  As of this writing, housing prices have fallen about 30% from 
their peak, and it is still unclear as to whether they have reached their trough.  If the final fall 
                                                 
6 The figures are from the Federal Reserve’s “Flow of Funds” data base. 
7 Again, these data are from the Federal Reserve’s “Flow of Funds” data base.   8
comes to 35%, this will represent a loss in value of $6.8 trillion in housing wealth – a sum that is 
quite similar to the loss of wealth from the bursting of the “tech” bubble. 
  The effects on the U.S. economy of the bursting of the housing bubble have been 
considerably more severe.  There was a collateral slide in the U.S. stock market that generated an 
additional $12.7 trillion in loss in aggregate stock market value between the end of the third 
quarter of 2007 and the end of the first quarter of 2009.
8  The U.S. economy entered a recession 
in December 2007 and emerged in August 2009.  Unemployment in the U.S. rose from a low of 
4.5% in May 2007 to a peak of 10.1% in October 2009; as of December 2010 the U.S. 
unemployment rate was still at 9.4%.  
The U.S. economy had entered “the Great Recession” – which (depending on the whether 
the length or depth of the recession is being measured) was either the worst recession since the 
early 1980s, or the worst recession since the 1930s.  Under either characterization, the 
consequences of the bursting of the housing bubble were far more severe than the effects of the 
bursting of the “tech” bubble. 
C. Why the difference? 
  Why were the severities of the consequences of these two recent asset bubble deflations 
so different?  A straightforward answer can be provided by examining who was holding the 
assets that shrunk in value. 
  In the case of the deflating of the “tech” bubble, the stock market losses were mostly 
absorbed directly by households: through their direct holdings of equities, through their holdings 
of equities-based mutual funds, and through their pension funds’ holdings of equities.  In 
essence, these were unleveraged holdings of the equities.  The losses were borne; the households 
                                                 
8 The decline in the U.S. stock market likely also reflected fears about the health of the world economy more 
broadly, as well as fears about the effects of the housing bust on the U.S. economy.   9
were poorer; they adjusted their spending; there were macroeconomic consequences; and the 
economy moved on. 
  In the case of the deflating of the housing bubble, households again have been the first-
absorbers of the losses.  And, again, by causing home-owning households to be poorer, the 
housing bust would cause these households to adjust their spending downward, with consequent 
macroeconomic effects.  Thus far, the effects should have been similar. 
However, to the extent that the losses in housing (and/or the consequent downturn in the 
economy) caused households to default on their mortgages, some of these losses have been 
transferred to the financial sector; as a consequence, the financial institutions that held the 
residential mortgages and/or held the mortgage-backed securities for which the mortgages were 
the underlying collateral experienced the losses.  One estimate (as of July 2009) puts those 
aggregate losses borne by the financial sector at about $1.3 trillion, with about $550 billion borne 
by banks and $205 billion borne by insurance companies.
9  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which 
are “government sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) have (as of early 2011) absorbed losses of 
around $220 billion
10 and may well absorb an additional $100-$200 billion of losses by the time 
that the full accounting of the housing debacle has settled.  Thus, over $1 trillion of the housing 
value losses have been transferred from defaulting households to these specific categories of 
financial institution.
11 
  Why have I singled out these categories?  Because these financial institutions are highly 
leveraged:  They have relatively small amounts of equity on their balance sheets, relative to the 
                                                 
9 See Zandi (2009). 
10 As of year-end 2007 they together had an aggregate of about $70 billion of net worth.  Subsequently, their losses 
have wiped out that entire net worth plus required (thus far) capital contributions from the U.S. Treasury of about 
$150 billion. 
11 Zandi (2009) also estimates losses to pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds as totaling $163 billion.  The 
first two categories are usually not leveraged at all or (for most hedge funds) usually not highly leveraged.   10
sizes of their debt obligations.  Accordingly, in a legal system of limited liability for equity 
holders, even modest (in percentage terms) losses by highly leveraged financial institutions can 
generate prospective losses for the debt holders.  Fears of such losses can lead to “runs” by the 
debt holders, who hope to get “100 cents on the dollar” if they demand repayment (withdraw 
their funds) before other claimants try to do the same; and the perceptions of runs at one 
financial institution may raise similar fears by imperfectly informed creditors at other (similar) 
financial institutions and thereby start a cascade or contagion of runs.
12 
Prior to 2008, such runs were thought to be largely or wholly the problem of depository 
institutions (see the discussion in Section IV below), which the creation of federal deposit 
insurance in 1933 had largely solved.  In 2008, however, the financial sector – and then public 
policy makers – came to the realization that runs could occur on large, thinly capitalized 
investment banks and bank holding companies that were financed with short-term obligations 
and that had made investments (of increasingly uncertain value) in residential mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities.  Table 1 illustrates the sizes and categories of the fifteen largest 
financial institutions at the end of 2007 and their (thin) levels of net worth or owners’ equity. (It 
is worth recalling that, in the context of financial institutions, their “capital” is – as a first 
approximation – the institution’s net worth or equity, and that the leverage of the institution is its 
ratio of assets to equity;
13 thus, to take an example from Table 1, Bear Stearns at the end of 2007 
had capital that was only 3% of its assets; or, equivalently, its leverage ratio was 33⅓-to-1.) 
  Consequently, having even $1 trillion of the (roughly) $7 trillion in housing losses spill 
into the highly leveraged domain of commercial banks, investment banks, GSEs, and (to a more 
                                                 
12 More formal discussions of runs can be found in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Postlewaite and Vives (1987), and 
Chen (1999). 
13 See, for example, the discussion in White (2009a).   11
limited extent) insurance companies was devastating to those parts of the financial sector.
14  The 
largest 15 financial institutions in the U.S. that are portrayed in Table 1, with an aggregate of 
$15.5 trillion in assets, had an aggregate of only $0.9 trillion in capital.  The entire U.S. 
depository system (of which the largest five members are represented in Table 1) at year-end 
2007 had $13 trillion in assets and only $1.3 trillion in capital.
15 
  The uncertainties of which financial institutions were still solvent – i.e., had assets with a 
(true, market) value that exceeded the value of their liabilities; or equivalently, had positive 
capital – expanded across the financial system, starting in the summer of 2007 and engulfed the 
financial system by the late summer of 2008.  These uncertainties meant that creditors to these 
financial institutions – often other financial institutions in the U.S. or overseas – were 
increasingly reluctant to lend to each other.  Insolvency fears morphed into liquidity pressures; 
and liquidity pressures, which caused some institutions to sell some assets at “fire sale” prices, in 
turn exacerbated insolvency fears. 
  As of the summer of 2008, depositors in commercial banks and thrift institutions were 
protected by deposit insurance, but only amounts up to $100,000 were covered.  Any household 
or business with deposit amounts greater than $100,000 would have to worry as to whether their 
bank was solvent.  Further, larger banks financed themselves with other kinds of short-term 
borrowings that were not insured.  All of investment banks’ liabilities were uninsured.  And the 
GSEs’ liabilities were nominally uninsured as well, although the financial markets had always 
treated them as though they had an “implicit” guarantee (since they were “government-sponsored 
enterprises”) – but that implicit guarantee had never been put to the test. 
                                                 
14 A similar characterization can be found in Greenspan (2010); see also Swagel (2009). 
15 These data are from FDIC reports.   12
  With uncertainties and fears of insolvencies rampant in the latter half of 2008 and 
persisting into early 2009, the financial system froze.  One manifestation of that freezing was the 
widening spread between the three-month Libor – the interest rate at which banks lend among 
themselves – and the three-month Treasury bill yield.
16  And the freezing of the financial system, 
in turn, exacerbated the stock market decline and the macroeconomic slowdown that would have 
accompanied the bursting of the housing bubble in any event. 
  In sum, having $1+ trillion of housing asset losses spill into the thinly capitalized 
financial sector greatly exacerbated the consequences of the deflating of the housing bubble.  
One important lesson from this, then, is that greater efforts must be made to make financial 
institutions less susceptible to the deflation of asset bubbles.  That means enhanced prudential 
regulation, to which we now turn. 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Zandi (2009, p. 11).   13
IV. Prudential Regulation
17 
  “Financial regulation” encompasses a wide range of activities and goals.
18  In this section 
we will focus on prudential regulation:
19 the regulatory effort to maintain the solvency of financial 
institutions.  Historically, prudential regulation in the U.S. has been applied to a number of 
categories of financial institutions – specifically, banks and other depository institutions, bank 
holding companies, insurance companies, money market mutual funds, defined-benefit 
(“traditional”) pension funds, and broker-dealers.  For the purposes of simplicity, we will confine 
our attention here to the prudential regulation of depository institutions (which, for the purposes of 
brevity, we will describe as “banks”).
20 
A. The arguments for prudential regulation. 
  The arguments for the prudential regulation of banks start with the limited liability 
protections for the owners of corporations and the consequent asymmetry of the gains and losses for 
the owners of a leveraged corporation (i.e., a corporation that is carrying a significant amount of 
debt on its balance sheet).  It’s clear that creditors to a corporation need to be protected against the 
risk-taking incentives of the corporation’s owners.  For non-financial corporations, the creditors 
(e.g., bond holders and/or lending banks) are expected to protect themselves – e.g., through 
covenants in bond indentures and through restrictions in lending agreements.  But for banks (and a 
number of other categories of financial institution) the creditors – for banks, they are primarily the 
depositors – are seen as unable to protect themselves adequately.  Hence, there is a longstanding 
                                                 
17 This section draws heavily on White (2011). 
18 In addition to prudential regulation, “financial regulation” can encompass efforts to protect consumers from 
“toxic” (harmful) financial products and services, protect them from fraud, require adequate information about 
financial products and services or about the finances of publicly traded companies, limit directly the prices and fees 
that can be charged by financial institutions, etc. 
19 In the U.S. the traditional phrase for this type of regulation has been “safety-and-soundness” regulation.  Outside 
of the U.S., however, “prudential” regulation has been the common term, and it is now widely used in the U.S. as 
well. 
20 Many of the arguments for and instruments of the prudential regulation of banks have their counterparts in the 
prudential regulation of other categories of financial institutions.   14
tradition – in the U.S., this tradition extends back at least to the 1860s
21 – of having government 
prudential regulation as the substitute protector for the depositors. 
  The arguments, specifically, for government prudential regulation of banks (instead of 
relying on depositors to protect themselves through covenants or other negotiated restrictions) are: 
  1) Banks are complex and difficult to understand – except (hopefully) by experts – even 
under the best of circumstances.
22 
  2) Depositors – even commercial (i.e., business) depositors – tend to be relatively 
unsophisticated with respect to understanding the activities and finances of banks. 
  3) The primary liabilities that are issued by banks tend to be short-term demandable 
deposits, which the depositors expect to be liquid and available at short notice at par (i.e., they don’t 
expect to bear losses); equivalently, there ought to be a safe place that relatively unsophisticated 
individuals (and businesses) can keep their money (and savings), as an alternative to cash that is 
stored in cookie jars or under mattresses.
23 
  4) Typically, there are large numbers of depositors in a bank, and the levels/amounts of their 
deposits vary over time.  Coordination among them, so as to agree on a set of covenants to impose 
on their bank – and to agree on who should do the necessary monitoring -- would be far more 
difficult than is the case for bond covenants (where there is typically a trustee, as well as a few 
dominant block holders of the bonds that have been issued by any company) or bank loans to non-
financial corporations (where there is typically a single bank or a consortium of a few banks). 
  5) Because of #1-4, banks are susceptible to runs:
24  If some depositors are unsure about the 
value of the bank’s assets but are worried that the assets may be inadequate to satisfy all depositors’ 
                                                 
21 The National Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864 created a national charter for banks and a 
national prudential regulator – the Comptroller of the Currency – to regulate them.  Even before then, the states as 
charterers of banks saw banks as special and restricted their activities.  Further, where states had created state-
backed systems of deposit insurance – New York was the first to do so in 1829 – they realized that they needed a 
system of regulation to try to contain the activities of banks that could put the deposit insurance system at risk. 
22 Morgan (2003) empirically demonstrates the validity of this argument. 
23 This last version is really an argument for deposit insurance; but then the deposit insurer would want a system of 
prudential regulation to protect itself. 
24 As was noted above, more formal discussions can be found in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Postlewaite and 
Vives (1987), and Chen (1999).   15
claims, those depositors may want to “run” to the bank to withdraw their funds before other 
depositors get the same idea.  Other depositors, seeing or hearing about the first group's actions, 
may similarly rush to withdraw their funds. 
  This general depositor “run” on the bank can be exacerbated by the realization that even a 
solvent bank is relatively illiquid, in the sense that it has loaned out almost all of the depositors’ 
funds and keeps only a small amount of cash on hand to deal with “normal” withdrawals. (Think of 
Jimmy Stewart's efforts, in the movie “It's a Wonderful Life,” to stop his depositors’ run by 
explaining to them that their money is not in the till but has been loaned to their neighbors.) 
  And, if depositors in the bank across the street see the run on the first bank and they fear that 
the same problems may apply to their bank as well, the depositors in this second bank may start a 
run on their bank.  Thus can a “contagion” or “cascade” of bank runs can develop.
25 
  6) Since a bank that is subject to a run by its depositors cannot satisfy all of their demands 
for cash withdrawals, the bank must either close (declare bankruptcy or its equivalent) or suspend 
payment until it can liquidate its assets.
26  Either of these outcomes would be unsatisfactory to 
depositors, which can serve to heighten fears and exacerbate runs. 
  7) The closure of a bank because of insolvency will impose losses on relatively 
unsophisticated depositors.  These losses may be considered to be unacceptable politically (as well 
as exacerbating the depositor nervousness that leads to runs). 
  8) The closure of a bank and the liquidation of its assets – which will mean the calling in 
(i.e., requiring repayment) of its loans – may deprive local households and businesses of a 
significant source of credit.  Even if there are alternative lending sources, the specialized knowledge 
that the bank has developed as to who is a creditworthy borrower (and who is not) may be lost, to 
                                                 
25 As became clear in September 2008, similar “runs” were possible by the short-term creditors to the thinly 
capitalized large investment banks in the U.S. 
26 And even for a solvent bank, the forced liquidation of its assets would likely yield losses and thus render it 
insolvent, generating losses for even the patient depositors.   16
the detriment of those creditworthy borrowers (who, at a minimum, will have to demonstrate their 
creditworthiness to another potential lender).
27 
  The roles of a prudential regulator, a central bank, and deposit insurance in maintaining a 
stable banking system can now be seen.  Prudential regulation is intended to prevent the bank from 
becoming insolvent and thereby prevent depositors from being exposed to losses.
28  The central 
bank can lend (provide liquidity) to an otherwise illiquid but solvent bank, to help the bank deal 
with any temporary nervousness that might develop among its depositors.
29  And deposit insurance 
provides a back-up reassurance to depositors and thus serves as an additional backstop against bank 
runs, in the event that prudential regulation has failed to prevent the bank’s insolvency.
 30 
B. The primary tools of prudential regulation. 
 1.  Capital  adequacy.  Since the goal of prudential regulation is to maintain the solvency of 
banks – i.e.,  to ensure that they have positive levels of capital – minimum capital levels (relative to 
the risks that are undertaken by the bank) are at the heart of any system of prudential regulation. 
31 
Equivalently, this means limits on leverage. 
  For all financial institutions, capital levels are so thin that accurate measurements of the 
value of the institution’s assets -- and thus of its capital (because capital is determined by simple 
subtraction) -- are crucial.  An accounting system that relies primarily on market values for the 
determination of asset values (with some allowance for the vagaries of thin markets), rather than 
on historical costs or on projected cash flows, is essential. 
  As a bank’s capital buffer gets thinner, prudential regulators should progressively restrict 
its activities.  At the limit of insolvency, the regulator must declare a receivership and take full 
                                                 
27 For example, Bernanke (1983) demonstrated that this was one of the major costs of the thousands of bank closures 
that accompanied the U.S. economy’s descent into the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
28 For a skeptical view as to the efficacy of prudential regulation, especially outside of the U.S. context, see Barth et 
al. (2006). 
29 Of course, in lending to the bank, the central bank becomes a creditor to the bank; at a minimum the central bank 
will want adequate collateral for its loan, and, more generally, it will want to assure itself of the solvency of the bank 
to which it is lending. 
30 For general arguments along these lines, see White (1991). 
31 Included in capital should be a “slice” of subordinated debt and/or debt that converts to equity (“contingent 
capital”) when capital levels decline.   17
control of the bank (see #6 below).  This system of progressive restrictions has come to be called 
“prompt corrective action.” 
  2. Activities limitations.  In principle, if prudential regulators could accurately ascertain the 
risks of all potential activities by a bank – including non-financial activities, such as owning and 
operating an automobile manufacturing facility, or a large department store – and could thereby 
assign the appropriate capital levels, then there would be no need for any restrictions on the 
activities of banks.  More realistically, prudential regulators will be limited in their ability to 
ascertain the riskiness of most non-financial activities – and perhaps even of some financial 
activities.  If prudential regulators cannot ascertain the riskiness of an activity, that activity ought not 
to be permitted for a bank.
32 
  3. Managerial competency requirements.  The failure of a bank – even a small, local bank – 
is clearly a more serious event than the failure of a corner delicatessen.  Requiring that the senior 
managers of a bank demonstrate their competency at running a bank naturally follows.
33 
  4. Close monitoring of the financial flows between a bank and its owners.  Because it is too 
easy to loot a bank – to extract assets from the bank in a way that benefits its owners but that leaves 
the liability holders at risk (such as excessive dividends to the owners, or favorable loans to the 
owners or to their family or their friends) – prudential regulators must closely monitor the financial 
flows between a bank and its owners (or their family, or their friends). 
 5.  Adequate  numbers  of well-trained and well-paid regulators.  Because prudential 
regulation involves sophisticated monitoring of sophisticated financial institutions, adequate 
numbers of well-trained and well-paid personnel to conduct this monitoring are essential. 
  6. A receivership regime for insolvent banks.  Once a bank reaches insolvency, it must be 
placed in a receivership (usually operated by the regulator or the deposit insurer).  The receivership 
extinguishes the rights of the owners and usually dismisses the senior management who “drove the 
                                                 
32 However, that activity may well be appropriate for a non-financial holding company of a bank.  See White 
(2009b) for a general argument along these lines. 
33 U.S. bank regulators require such competency on the part of the senior management for start-up (denovo) banks.  
And it remains an occasionally used tool for personnel removal at more seasoned banks.   18
bank into the ditch.”  The regulator can then decide whether the best course of action is to liquidate 
the bank or to find an acquirer.
34 
C. The wider application of prudential regulation. 
  Although the prudential regime just described applies specifically to banks, its justifications 
and principles should apply to any large financial institution where the society-wide consequences 
of its insolvency would be significant – because its liabilities are “run-able” and/or a cascade of 
bankruptcies/insolvencies/illiquidities might follow and/or its liability holders are in a poor position 
to protect themselves.  This was certainly the case at year-end 2007 (see Table 1): 
  Five large investment banks alone accounted for over $4 trillion in assets, with only 3-
4% capital and highly run-able liabilities (with no effective prudential regulatory regime, 
no guarantees for the liabilities, and no access to the Federal Reserve for liquidity 
purposes); 
  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together had $1.7 trillion in assets and another $3.5 trillion 
in outstanding mortgage-backed securities that they had guaranteed, with only 4-5% 
capital (with a weak prudential regulatory regime, the uncertain “implicit” guarantee of 
their liabilities because they were GSEs, and no access to the Fed); 
  The holding company of Citigroup was effectively another investment bank with $0.9 
trillion in assets (on top of a $1.3 trillion commercial bank), with low capital and run-
able liabilities (and a weak prudential regime by the Fed and no insurance for the 
liabilities); and 
  The holding company of AIG had written hundreds of billions of credit default swaps 
(in essence, insurance policies) on residential mortgage-backed securities but had set 
aside no capital to cover possible losses on those transactions (with weak prudential 
oversight by the Office of Thrift Supervision). 
                                                 
34 The operation of a receivership is best envisioned as operating in conjunction with the deposit insurer:  The 
deposit insurer pays off the insured depositors and then must deal with its consequent loss: the negative net worth 
“hole” of the insolvent bank.  The receiver tries to find the best route to maximizing the value of the remaining 
assets and thus minimizing the size of the deposit insurer’s loss.   19
  Had more effective prudential regulation been in place at the time, the consequences of the 
collapse of the housing bubble surely would have been far milder.  As a collateral benefit, more 
effective prudential regulation would likely have moderated the inflation of the bubble in the first 
place, since these financial institutions would have been less leveraged and thereby less able to 
invest in the residential mortgages and the mortgage-backed securities that helped inflate the bubble. 
  Arguably, the financial world is different as of early 2011.  Only four of the five investment 
banks survived, and they are each now parts of bank holding companies.  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are in government conservatorships and are unlikely to emerge in any form that is similar to 
their previous GSE status.  AIG has been under the supervision of the Federal Reserve since the fall 
of 2008 and will surely be treated as a bank holding company going forward. 
  The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created a Financial Stability Oversight Council, with an 
obligation to identify large financial institutions that are systemically important in the sense that is 
described above but that are not otherwise covered by a prudential regulatory regime; any such 
identified institution would be subject to prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve.  GE Capital 
would appear to be the major candidate (see Table 1). 
  The prudential regulatory domain of the Federal Reserve has been considerably widened 
since the end of 2007.  One can only hope that they have truly learned the importance of effective 
prudential regulation of bank holding companies. 
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V. Conclusion 
  Public policy efforts to prevent asset price bubbles beforehand are a fool’s errand – or 
worse.  At best, they will fail; at worst, they will also discourage efficient and productive asset 
price changes. 
  Nevertheless, the heightened policy concerns about the consequences of the collapse of 
the U.S. housing bubble are well founded.  Those consequences were far more severe than they 
needed to be. 
Understanding the reasons for that exacerbated severity – that enough of the losses 
spilled into the highly leveraged portions of the financial sector to cause widespread fears of 
insolvency and illiquidity, with the consequent freezing of the functioning of the sector – is 
crucial for sensible policy going forward.  At the center of such sensible policy must be a 
strengthened system of prudential regulation of the kinds of financial institutions that created the 
difficulties of 2007-2009. 
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Table 1: The Fifteen Largest Financial Institutions in the U.S., 2007 
(by asset size, December 31, 2007) 
 
 
Rank  Financial institution  Category 
Assets 
($ billion) 
Equity as a 
% of assets 
      
1 Citigroup  Commercial  bank  $2,182  5.2%
2  Bank of America  Commercial bank  1,716  8.6
3  JPMorgan Chase  Commercial bank  1,562  7.9
4  Goldman Sachs  Investment bank  1,120  3.8
5 American  International  Group Insurance  conglomerate  1,061  9.0
6  Morgan Stanley  Investment bank  1,045  3.0
7  Merrill Lynch  Investment bank  1,020  3.1
8 Fannie  Mae  GSE  883  5.0
9 Freddie  Mac  GSE  794  3.4
10 Wachovia  Commercial  bank  783  9.8
11 Lehman  Brothers  Investment  bank  691  3.3
12  Wells Fargo  Commercial bank  575  8.3
13 MetLife  Insurance  559  6.3
14 Prudential  Insurance  486  4.8
15  Bear Stearns  Investment bank  395  3.0
 
  Note: The Federal Home Loan Bank System ($1,272B in 2007) and TIAA-CREF ($420B 
in 2007) have been excluded from this list; if GE Capital were a standalone finance company, its 
asset size ($650B in 2007) would place it at #12. 
Source: Fortune 500, May 5, 2008, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 
 